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THE MOLD THAT SHAPES HEARSAY LAW
Richard D. Friedman∗
ABSTRACT
In response to an article previously published in the Florida Law
Review by Professor Ben Trachtenberg, I argue that the historical thesis
of Crawford v. Washington is basically correct: The Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment reflects a principle about how
witnesses should give testimony, and it does not create any broader
constraint on the use of hearsay. I argue that this is an appropriate limit
on the Clause, and that in fact for the most part there is no good reason
to exclude nontestimonial hearsay if live testimony by the declarant to
the same proposition would be admissible. I further suggest that the
prevailing law of evidence is consistent with this approach to a
significant degree, because the doctrine is much more receptive to
nontestimonial hearsay than to testimonial hearsay. In contrast to
Professor Trachtenberg, I am not troubled by the fact that this approach
would probably not block admissibility of one of the notable statements
in the trial of Walter Raleigh, or by the fact that the approach supports
the willingness of some courts to admit evidence of statements made in
support of lawful joint ventures. I conclude by offering some
suggestions as to how hearsay doctrine might be transformed to reflect
the principles advocated in this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, in Crawford v. Washington,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not
create a substantive standard of reliability by which the admissibility of
hearsay is to be assessed.2 Rather, it provides a categorical procedural
rule that, with only rather narrow qualifications, bars use of a
testimonial statement against an accused, unless the accused has had an
opportunity (at trial, if reasonably possible) to be confronted with the
witness who made the statement.3
When Crawford came down, I thought that the categorical treatment
of testimonial statements reflected such an obvious core principle of our
criminal justice system that I hoped lower courts and prosecutors would
soon come to accept it and the Supreme Court itself would adhere to it
steadfastly. I should have known better.
But I really thought I was safe in assuming that those on the defense
side would recognize that the impact of Crawford has obviously been to
fortify the confrontation right. And of course many do. But Professor
Ben Trachtenberg, in an article published in this Review,4 focuses on
the fact that the Crawford doctrine narrows the theoretical scope of the
Confrontation Clause, so that it applies only to testimonial statements
rather than—as under the prior regime—all hearsay statements.5 He is
troubled by this fact. I am not.
I will make the following main points in this Essay:
1. However much one may quibble about details, the basic
historical thesis of Crawford is correct: The confrontation right, as
stated in the Sixth Amendment and recognized over centuries in the
common law system, reflects a principle about how witnesses should
give testimony—under oath, face-to-face with the adverse party, and
subject to cross-examination. It does not express a rule about the
admissibility of hearsay in general.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Id. at 67–69.
3. Id.
4. Ben Trachtenberg, Confronting Coventurers: Conspirator Hearsay, Sir Walter
Raleigh, and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1669 (2012).
5. Id. at 1672–73.
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2. It is perfectly appropriate to limit the Confrontation Clause to
a rule about testimony, with other doctrines providing for exclusion on
other grounds.
3. For the most part, if hearsay is nontestimonial and live
testimony of the declarant to the same proposition would be admissible,
there is no good reason that justifies exclusion of the hearsay.
4. This approach helps explain many of the exemptions to the
hearsay rule, including the exemption for statements by a conspirator of
the accused.6 It also helps explain a long-term trend in the American
judicial system to be more receptive to nontestimonial hearsay. Thus, to
a great extent the confrontation principle is the mold that shapes hearsay
law. The mold of a bronze statue shapes the statue by setting limits on
where the molten metal can go; similarly, the confrontation principle
sets limits on the types of statements to which hearsay exemptions
might apply.
5. Under this approach, the confrontation right would
presumably not block admission of one of the notable statements in the
case of Sir Walter Raleigh. But that fact does not undermine the merits
of the approach, and neither does the fact that the approach supports the
willingness of some courts to admit evidence of statements made in
support of “lawful joint ventures.”
6. Black-letter law effectively creates a presumption that hearsay
is inadmissible. The law would be improved by reversing that
presumption with respect to probative nontestimonial hearsay. That is,
courts and rulemakers should treat such hearsay as inadmissible only for
good cause, such as the proponent’s superior ability to produce the
declarant as a live witness at trial.
I. HISTORY
An originalist like Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion in Crawford, seeks to determine the public meaning of the
Confrontation Clause as of the time of its adoption in 1791. I believe
that history offers a deeper lesson concerning the meaning of the
6. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The Rule uses the term “co-conspirators,” and this is
the common parlance. But James Joseph Duane, Some Thoughts on How the Hearsay Exception
for Conspirators’ Statements Should—and Should Not—Be Amended, 165 F.R.D. 299, 304–12
(1996), argues at some length that we should speak instead of a party's conspirators. If someone
puts so much energy, learning, and rhetoric into such a trivial point he may well be right, and
largely for that reason I have made a habit of adhering to Professor Duane’s locution.
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confrontation right, for the right reflects a principle that has been central
to the common law system, among others, for centuries.7
The essential idea of the right is actually very simple: A rational
system of adjudication must depend, in large part, on information
provided by witnesses. Given this premise, the system must decide the
procedure by which the witnesses provide that information—that is, by
which they testify. A common requirement is that testimony be given
under oath or some similar form of solemnification.8 Beyond that,
various procedures for giving testimony are possible. For example, one
could, as the ancient Athenians did, require that witnesses provide their
testimony in writing and under seal.9 Or one could require, as the old
courts of continental Europe did, that witnesses testify before officials
and out of the presence of the parties.10 But for centuries, one of the
great prides of the English was that in their system, as in those of the
ancient Hebrews and Romans, witnesses against an accused gave their
testimony openly, “face-to-face” with the accused.11 As the system
developed further, it also became clear that the accused had a right to
subject the witnesses against him to cross-examination.12 And although
the right to be confronted with adverse witnesses was usually provided
at trial, a well-developed body of law allowed the prosecution to use
prior testimony of the witness if she was unavailable at trial and the
accused had had an opportunity to be confronted by her.13 Although the
English did not honor the right of confrontation without fail, it was a
clearly established norm that migrated to America.14 The new states
incorporated it in their constitutions, and it was included in the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.15
This history all seems very clear. Indeed, I do not know of anybody
who denies any part of this account. Certainly Professor Trachtenberg
does not. And the account I have just given is, in essence, the same as
that offered in Crawford.16 So then why is there any historical debate
about the confrontation right? The answer, I believe, is hinted at in this
7. The summary presented here draws from the fuller account in Richard D. Friedman &
Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1201–09 (2002).
8. Id. at 1209.
9. WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS, A DAY IN OLD ATHENS: A PICTURE OF ATHENIAN LIFE 137
(1960) (“All pertinent testimony is now written down, and the tablets sealed up by the
magistrate.”).
10. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1202–03 & n.111.
11. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)).
12. See, e.g., King v. Paine (1696), 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.) 585; 5 Mod. 163, 165;
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45–46.
13. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1204 n.19.
14. Id. at 1204–05, 1206–09; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
15. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1206–09.
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–50.
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passage written by Professor Trachtenberg:
[H]earsay law remained largely unsettled at the time of
ratification, making it difficult to believe that the authors
and ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment gave serious thought
to the various classes of hearsay identified in modern
blackletter evidence law.17
I agree with Professor Trachtenberg that hearsay law was not wellsettled at the time the Confrontation Clause was ratified as part of the
Sixth Amendment. Indeed, it had just begun to form.18 But the
conclusion to be drawn from this is not that the authors and ratifiers of
the Clause intended to require the exclusion of all hearsay, or of all
hearsay not deemed by a court to be reliable. The Confrontation Clause
was not an attempt to express a principle of hearsay law at all.19 Rather,
it expressed a well-understood and long-established principle of how
witnesses give their testimony.20 One way of demonstrating this is to
examine Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise on evidence, initially published in
the mid-eighteenth century and often considered the first real treatise on
the subject. It includes very little discussion of hearsay. Although
Gilbert said that hearsay was “no evidence,”21 he did not elaborate on
what this meant. For example, he included no definition of hearsay—a
matter of considerable complexity under modern law22—or any
suggestion that the rule might be subject to an extensive set of

17. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1678.
18. Edmund Burke said in 1794, albeit with considerable exaggeration, that “it was true,
something had been written on the Law of Evidence, but very general, very abstract, and
comprised in so small a compass, that a parrot that he had known might get them by rote in one
half-hour, and repeat them in five minutes.” HISTORY OF THE TRIAL OF WARREN HASTINGS, ESQ.,
84 (1796) (Feb. 25, 1794 entry). Professor Tom Gallanis has shown that “[u]ntil the 1780s, the
courts rarely discussed the hearsay rule.” T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84
IOWA L. REV. 499, 536 (1999). Gallanis argues that there was a burst of activity in the 1780s and
that much of the structure of modern hearsay law was in place by 1800. Id. Even assuming he is
right about the latter assertion—I have some doubts, because I know of no articulation of
anything like the modern definition of hearsay before 1800—it does not suggest that those
developments underlay the Confrontation Clause, for at least two reasons. First, the
confrontation right was expressed in state constitutions before and shortly after 1780; it
expressed a principle understood to be very old. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at
1206–11. Second, it is unlikely that such recent developments would have become known in
America, and certainly not well enough absorbed to have formed a common basis of
understanding of the meaning of proposed constitutional text. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the
Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 153–62 (2005).
19. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1209.
20. Id.
21. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107 (1754).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (expressing the basic definition of hearsay).
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exemptions.23 And of course it certainly was not true that there was a
general rule in practice barring everything that would come within the
modern definition of hearsay; in fact, courts readily admitted a great
deal of hearsay.24 Gilbert’s brief mention of hearsay was incorporated in
a long chapter about witnesses,25 which included the procedure by
which they should give their testimony.26 And, in a separate section, he
discussed in considerable detail the law governing depositions.27 This
sophisticated doctrine determined when a prior testimonial statement of
a witness could be admitted at trial because the witness was unavailable.
It is strikingly similar in substance to the modern hearsay exception for
former testimony.28 But it was not then thought of as an exception to a
rule against hearsay; rather, it was an alternative method by which a
witness’s testimony could be offered if the adverse party had a chance
to be confronted with the witness and the witness was unavailable.29
What happened then? It appears that, as lawyers played a larger role
in criminal trials, they demanded that they be able to cross-examine
anybody whose out-of-court statement might be introduced against their
clients to prove the truth of what it asserted; they did not restrict the
demand to those whose statements were testimonial in nature.30 Indeed,
in the first half of the nineteenth century, they pushed the doctrine so far
that it included out-of-court conduct that did not assert the statement in
question but appeared to reflect the actor’s belief in it.31 Such a broad
rule of exclusion would be untenable if it were unqualified, and
23. Id. 801(d) (exempting certain statements from the definition of hearsay), 803, 804,
807 (providing exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
24. Compare Gallanis, supra note 18, at 512, 514–15 (“Hearsay, for example, occupies
much of the modern law of evidence but in 1755 was accepted [in civil trials] almost without
comment. . . . Hearsay went almost as unregulated [in criminal trials] as in civil trials. . . . Some
notion thus existed of hearsay as an evidentiary problem, but the rules restricting it had not yet
fully developed.”), and John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A
View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1189–90 (1996) (noting that “it is hard
to believe that the courts of the mid-eighteenth century enforced the hearsay rule,” that
“[c]ounsel seem not to have objected to hearsay often,” and that “the courts seem to have
received it aplenty,” and surmising “that the question of excluding hearsay and other suspect
types of testimony may still have been remitted to judicial discretion, rather than being subject
to firm rules of exclusion”), with Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1702 (saying hearsay was
excluded by the common law since the seventeenth century).
25. GILBERT, supra note 21, at 86–104.
26. Id. at 94–104.
27. Id. at 44–51.
28. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
29. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1204 n.120.
30. See Gallanis, supra note 18, at 545–46.
31. See Wright v. Doe dem. Tatham (1838), 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.); 5 Cl. & F. 670. The
reach of the rule as it was applied in Wright is suggested by the title of the classic article, Judson
F. Falknor, The “Hear-Say” Rule as a “See-Do” Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 133, 134 (1961).
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throughout the rest of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
principal movement was a loosening of the hearsay restraint by
expanding the exemptions to the exclusionary rule.32 The result was a
doctrine of great breadth but of questionable force—one that was
marked by a jumble of exemptions supposedly justified by various
assertions of cracker-barrel psychology. For example, if people are
startled, they almost surely tell the truth, don’t they?33 And a person
would not lie to her doctor about her condition, would she?34 The
rationales underlying both the basic exclusionary rule and the
exemptions were so unpersuasive that they made the doctrine seem of
dubious value.35 And that welter of complexity tended to occlude the
simple driving principle that lay at the heart of the hearsay rule—that
when one gives testimony against a person, especially against a criminal
defendant, she should do it in open court if reasonably possible, but in
any event, under oath, subject to cross-examination, and face-to-face.
Indeed, even after holding that the Confrontation Clause expresses a
fundamental right that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates against
the states,36 the Supreme Court seemed at a loss as to what the
confrontation right actually means.37 After fifteen years, in Ohio v.
Roberts,38 the Court finally adopted a theory of the Clause, based on the
perception that it acts as a filter against unreliable evidence.39 Roberts
virtually constitutionalized the law of hearsay: it provided on the one
hand that the offer of any hearsay statement against an accused creates a
presumptive confrontation problem, and on the other that the problem
could be relieved by bringing the statement within a “firmly rooted
hearsay exception.”40 Even if a statement did not fit within such an
exception, Roberts indicated that it might yet avoid the confrontation
bar if it was supported by “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness”41—a doctrine that rather closely resembled the residual

32. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What Is Happening—to the Confrontation
Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 595 (2007) (“As the nineteenth century progressed, courts
relaxed their attitudes somewhat toward hearsay evidence, to the point where they allowed
several exceptions to the rule.”).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
34. See id. 803(4).
35. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations of the Law of
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437–39 (1928) (discussing criticism of the excited utterance
exception).
36. Id. at 406.
37. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1980) (pointing out the Court’s struggle to
“accommodate the[] competing interests” of the Confrontation Clause).
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id. at 65–66, 72.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id.
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exception to the rule against hearsay.42 It took nearly a quarter century
more before the Court in Crawford rediscovered the essential nature of
the confrontation right.
II. TEXT AND STRUCTURE
It might help to look at the text of the Confrontation Clause in the
context of the entire Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence [sic].43
This certainly seems to be a set of rules about criminal procedure.
And the Clause on which we are focusing seems to say quite clearly that
the accused has a right to insist that those who testify against him be
brought in his presence; it also seems obvious that included implicitly is
at least the right to insist that those witnesses give their testimony in his
presence (not just that the accused be able to see them at some time,
though not necessarily when they testify). Furthermore, note that the
Clause, like the rest of the Amendment, speaks in simple, categorical
terms. A court does not have to weigh in the particular case whether the
accused has a right to a public trial, or to the assistance of counsel; the
text expressly says that “the accused shall enjoy” these rights “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions.” There may be ambiguity about what any of
these rights mean, of course. How fast is speedy enough? What
measures must be taken to determine if a jury is impartial? But the text
clearly says that the rights, whatever their bounds, must be honored in
every criminal case. For the Confrontation Clause, that means that a
court must determine who “the witnesses against” the accused are, and
then allow the accused “to be confronted with” them, whatever that
means. The court is not free to say that in the particular case the right is
not worth protecting.
Given that the Clause insists on a prescribed procedure for
testimony, it cannot be evaded by presenting evidence in court of
testimony not satisfying that procedure. Suppose, for example, that, as
in Crawford, a witness describes a crime to a police officer in the
station house, knowing full well that the officer is gathering evidence
42. See FED. R. EVID. 807(1).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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for a criminal prosecution.44 Suppose further that, not for any reason
attributable to conduct of the accused, the witness does not attend trial
and that the prosecution attempts instead to introduce evidence of her
statement—perhaps the police officer’s own testimony recounting the
out-of-court witness’s statement, or perhaps some recorded form of the
out-of-court statement, such as an affidavit in which the witness makes
the statement or an audio or videotape of her making it. Plainly, such an
evasion cannot be allowed, because doing so would effectively create a
system in which a witness could testify out of court, without
confrontation. And so the procedural requirement of the Confrontation
Clause is necessarily enforced by means of an evidentiary rule of
exclusion.
But as the history indicates and the text confirms, the Confrontation
Clause does not impose a substantive limit on evidence.45 That is, it
does not prescribe that a piece of evidence is inadmissible because there
is some defect in the evidence itself, as opposed to the procedure by
which it was created, leading it to be insufficiently probative or
excessively prejudicial.46
It is therefore striking to me that Professor Trachtenberg speaks of
the pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause as having “saved us” from
admission of a class of evidence that he thinks should be excluded, and
of the post-Crawford Clause as not doing so.47 The only thing the
Confrontation Clause is supposed to “save” us from is a system in
which witnesses testify without adhering to proper procedures. If the
Constitution imposes substantive constraints on evidence, they must be
found elsewhere. There should be nothing startling about the idea that
the Confrontation Clause has a limited scope.
Moreover, I believe that this limitation actually increases the
effectiveness of the Clause. To be clear, I do not believe that the aim of
scholars should be to try to develop a construction of the Clause that
maximizes the evidence it excludes. Rather, as I have put the point
repeatedly in amicus briefs before the Supreme Court, I believe our aim
should be—or at least mine is—“to promote a sound understanding of
the confrontation right, one that recognizes the importance of the right
in our system of criminal justice and at the same time is practical in
administration and does not unduly hamper prosecution of crime.”48 But
it is still a fair question whether Crawford, by narrowing the scope of
the Clause but prescribing a categorical right within that scope, has on
44. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004).
45. Id. at 61; supra Part I.
46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
47. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1700–03.
48. See, e.g., Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2013) (No. 10-8505).
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net benefitted criminal defendants. From Professor Trachtenberg’s
focus on one class of statements that, he asserts, would have been
excluded under Roberts but not under Crawford, it appears that he
regards the answer as doubtful.49 I do not. Although I am not happy
about some post-Crawford decisions that, in my view, have taken an
unduly narrow view of the confrontation right,50 I think there is no
doubt that the Clause has more force after Crawford than it did before.
And, though the proposition is less subject to proof, I believe that force
is attributable in part to the limitation in scope.
The facts of Crawford suggest the first of these propositions: Sylvia
Crawford made a formal, audiotaped statement to the police in the
station house describing a knife fight that had occurred earlier that
day.51 Everyone in the room knew at the time that the police were
taking the statement for possible use in preparation of a criminal
prosecution.52 And yet the trial court admitted the statement, and the
Washington Supreme Court held that doing so did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.53 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in
Crawford reviewed some of the common types of testimonial
statements that courts frequently admitted during the Roberts regime,
such as statements at plea allocutions and accomplice confessions
implicating the accused.54 There is no doubt now that the Confrontation
Clause bars use of such statements absent an opportunity for
confrontation.
Consider also Hammon v. Indiana.55 There, while a police officer
held Hershel Hammon at bay, his wife, sitting in their living room with
another officer, accused him of having assaulted her earlier that
evening.56 She made an oral statement to the officer and immediately
thereafter signed an affidavit to the same effect. At trial, before

49. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1695–96.
50. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2010), I thought the Court should have
established that a statement to a known police officer accusing another of a crime is per se
testimonial. Instead, the Court held that a statement made primarily to resolve an ongoing
emergency is not testimonial. Id. at 828. In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150, 1167
(2011), the Court applied the emergency doctrine to hold a statement accusing the defendant of
a shooting nontestimonial even though it was made half an hour after the shooting and several
blocks away. In Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012), a fractured Court held that a
lab report of a DNA test performed on material taken from a vaginal swab of a rape victim was
not testimonial.
51. 541 U.S. at 38–39.
52. See id. at 53 n.4.
53. Id. at 38, 41.
54. Id. at 63–65.
55. 547 U.S. 813 (2010). This case was decided together with Davis v. Washington. I
represented Hammon in the Supreme Court.
56. Id. at 819–20.
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Crawford came down, the court held both statements admissible.57
When Hammon’s counsel objected to admission of the affidavit, the
prosecution responded that it was made under oath.58 “That doesn't give
us the opportunity to cross examine [the] person who allegedly drafted
it,” replied defense counsel. “Makes me mad.” The trial court advised
counsel with withering scorn, “You might want to refresh your memory
regarding the hearsay rules,” and then held that the affidavit satisfied
the hearsay exception for present sense impressions and thus did not
pose a confrontation problem.59 After Crawford, the state conceded that
admission of the affidavit was error60—and eight Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court held, as Crawford should have put beyond doubt, that
admission of the officer’s testimony of the oral statement was also a
confrontation violation.61
Finally, note the dramatic transformation concerning forensic lab
reports. Before Crawford, many jurisdictions routinely admitted them
without any live testimony by the persons who prepared them.62 The
Confrontation Clause posed no obstacle. But now, as a result of a
“rather straightforward application” of Crawford’s holding in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts,63 that has changed. If the prosecution wishes to
introduce a lab report purporting to show, for example, that a given
material was cocaine or that the accused had an elevated blood alcohol
level, then absent a stipulation (which the accused is often willing to
make), the prosecution must ordinarily provide the author of the report
as a live witness.64
The categorical nature of the confrontation right as articulated in
Crawford clearly has contributed to its increased vigor: If a statement is
testimonial, and there has been no opportunity for confrontation, then it
is clear, with only narrow qualifications, that there has been a violation
of the right.65 There is wiggle room, of course, in determining what
types of statements are testimonial,66 but there is considerably less of it
57. Id. at 820.
58. Id.
59. Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hammon v. Indiana, 132 S. Ct. 2221
(2012) (No. 05-5705.), 2005 WL 3617526, at *19–20.
60. Id. at *106.
61. Davis, 547 U.S. at 815, 834 (companion case).
62. See, e.g., Valerie J. Silverman, Testing the Testimonial Doctrine: The Impact of
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts on State-Level Criminal Prosecutions and Procedure, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2011) (describing the change in procedure for lab report admission in
Massachusetts and Virginia).
63. 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009).
64. Id. at 311, 328.
65. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). One qualification is that the accused
may have forfeited the right. The Court has also left open the possibility that there is a separate
dying-declaration exception to the right. Id. at 56 n.6.
66. The Court in Crawford intentionally avoided defining “testimonial.” Id. at 68.
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than there was under Roberts in determining that a statement was
reliable. In part the difference is attributable to the facts that a statement
could be deemed reliable under Roberts because of case-specific
factors, but to a large extent the appellate courts resolve as a general
matter the question of whether a given type of statement is testimonial.
One could, of course, imagine a doctrine that combined Crawford
and Roberts, providing that a statement may not be admissible for its
truth against an accused if either (a) it is testimonial and the accused has
not had an opportunity to be confronted with the person who made the
statement, or (b) it is deemed unreliable by the court. But there would
be no logic holding together such an artificially constructed doctrine.
The simple, fundamental principle that underlies the Confrontation
Clause as articulated in Crawford—that a witness against an accused
should testify in the presence of the accused, subject to crossexamination—would again be obscured. And over time, I believe, a
type of entropy would set in. Given the back-up of a fuzzy reliability
test, courts would be tempted to minimize the scope and importance of
the relatively hard-edged testimonial test, and ultimately we would be
left with something very much like the Roberts test once again. To be
sure, this prediction is speculative, but I believe it reflects the way of the
world. In any given case, the loss of evidentiary value that may be
created by insisting on the confrontation right is usually more salient
than the long-term harm of diminishing the right. And so there would be
a tendency to weaken the right, little by little.
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NONTESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
I will proceed now on the assumption that, as Crawford suggested
and subsequent cases make clear, the Confrontation Clause simply does
not apply to nontestimonial statements.67 Operating on the same
assumption—about which he is less happy than I am—Professor
Trachtenberg contends that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments should act as “constitutional backstops” to
require the exclusion of nontestimonial hearsay that is offered against
an accused and that a court deems unreliable.68 I am dubious. I will not
go so far as to deny the possibility that some nontestimonial evidence
might be so potentially prejudicial and have so little probative value that
it ought to be rendered constitutionally inadmissible. But as a general
matter, I think there is no need for a constitutional bar on nontestimonial
hearsay. Indeed, I will go further: For the most part, if live testimony of
the declarant to a given proposition would be admissible, then usually
evidentiary law, as well as constitutional law, should be receptive to
67. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
823–25 (2006).
68. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1702.
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evidence that the declarant made a nontestimonial assertion of that
proposition out of court. Note that by confining this claim to
nontestimonial assertions, I am putting aside cases in which admission
of the hearsay evidence would amount to allowing witnesses to testify
out of court.
A. Reliability
When a statement is not testimonial, why should hearsay not be
admitted? Professor Trachtenberg worries, as others have, about the
admissibility of unreliable evidence.69 I find the concern perplexing. For
one thing, like most of those who use the term, Professor Trachtenberg
makes no attempt to define reliability. So I offer my own definition, one
that I believe captures the sense of the term as used in ordinary
parlance: Evidence is reliable proof of a given proposition if and only if,
given the evidence, it is highly improbable that the proposition is false.
Note that this is a very demanding standard. So one problem is that
very few items of evidence meet it; on some contested issues, none at
all will do so. Apart from that, our conception of a trial is not that the
court winnows out all unreliable evidence, allowing the jurors to hear
only evidence that appears to point them in the right direction. If it
were, there would be really nothing left to try, because the outcome
would be predetermined. Indeed, the epitome of acceptable evidence—
live testimony of eyewitnesses—is notoriously unreliable.70 The essence
of a trial is to present the trier of fact with a range of evidence, which
may point in both directions and much of which might be extremely
unreliable, and leave it to the trier to do the best it can to weigh the
evidence on both sides and reach a conclusion. A trial is a test, and we
should not shrink from the facts that trials deal with imperfect inputs
and that they may have uncertain outcomes.
B. The Probative–Prejudicial Balance
Perhaps a response to the argument I have just made is that I am
simply quibbling with terminology, and that the true question is whether
the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Reliability is a
sufficient but not necessary condition for that test to be satisfied. But
there is no basis for concluding that hearsay in general tends to be more
prejudicial than probative. On the contrary, if live testimony of the
declarant to a given proposition would be more probative than
69. See id. at 1702–03.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1968); Understand the Causes:
Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Eyewitness Misidentification.php (“Eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of
wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a role in nearly 75% of convictions overturned through
DNA testing.”).
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prejudicial, then, in most cases, secondary evidence that the declarant
has asserted the proposition would be more probative than prejudicial as
well.71 True, the secondary evidence deprives the trier of fact of some of
the tools it might find useful in assessing the truthfulness of the
declarant, but that in itself does not warrant exclusion. To justify
excluding the evidence on this basis, we would have to conclude not
only that the trier of fact is unable to take this factor into account and
discount the weight it places on the evidence accordingly; we would
also have to conclude that the defect is so great, and the trier’s inability
so pronounced, that the trier’s probable overvaluation of the evidence, if
it is presented to them, is greater in significance than the loss of
probative value if the evidence is excluded. But so far as I am aware,
there is no empirical evidence that jurors tend to overvalue hearsay to
this degree, or indeed at all. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that
jurors undervalue hearsay, and there has certainly been no
demonstration that the use of hearsay, rather than of no evidence at all
from the declarant, impairs the search for truth.72
It appears, then, that in most cases in which a live witness’s
testimony of a given proposition would be more probative than
prejudicial, the same conclusion can be drawn about hearsay evidence
tending to prove that the same person made a nontestimonial out-ofcourt assertion of the proposition. That is not the end of the story,
though.
C. Best-Evidence Considerations
It is possible that the hearsay should be excluded, even though it is
more probative than prejudicial, on best-evidence grounds. That is, in
some circumstances it may be that exclusion of this hearsay will induce
the proponent, or others similarly situated, to present better evidence
than the hearsay—presumably, the live testimony of the declarant at
71. See Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1961, 1976 (1997).
72. Much of the literature is reviewed in Roger C. Park, Visions of Applying the Scientific
Method to the Hearsay Rule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1149 (2003). Professor Park concludes that
“it is difficult to draw broad, general inferences from the empirical literature about the impact of
hearsay evidence.” Id. at 1167. As he points out, the question of impact, whether hearsay “is
strong medicine,” is not the important one for determining legal impact; that issue, rather, is
“whether hearsay evidence helps or hurts the quest for accurate verdicts,” and an experiment
will not help determine that unless the investigator knows “the ground truth.” Id. According to
Park, “[t]here have been two hearsay experiments in which the experimenters started with a real
incident, knew the ground truth, and sought to examine whether jurors could use hearsay
reliably in reaching accurate verdicts.” Id. Although Park acknowledges that “it is hard to draw
too much from them because neither experiment involved cross-examination,” he points out that
“[t]hey both reached results that should provide comfort to those who favor wider admission of
hearsay.” Id. at 1168.
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trial, or at least at a deposition.73
1. The Unavailable Declarant
At least in the usual case, exclusion can be warranted on bestevidence grounds only if the declarant is available, or would have been
available had the proponent acted with reasonable diligence. If, for
example, the declarant died shortly after making the statement, the
proponent was not responsible for the death, and the proponent could
not reasonably have anticipated a later evidentiary need for the
statement, then the proponent should not be held to account for failure
to produce the declarant as a live witness at trial or deposition.74
Similarly, if the declarant is a person whose identity the proponent
could not reasonably be expected to know, it would make no sense to
exclude the hearsay on best-evidence grounds.75
2. The Available Declarant
Even if the declarant is available, I think the law should usually be
hesitant to exclude nontestimonial hearsay to induce the proponent to
produce live testimony. The situation is rather subtle and complex; here
I present only a very brief summary of an argument I have made
elsewhere.76
Bear in mind three propositions that are true by hypothesis: (1) the
hearsay is not testimonial in nature; (2) it is more probative than
prejudicial; and (3) the proponent is satisfied to rely on the hearsay
rather than go to the trouble and expense of producing the declarant.
Also, given that the proponent could produce the declarant as a live
witness, then presumably the opponent also could do so, if he cared
enough about examining her. That, it appears to me, should ordinarily
be enough to satisfy constitutional concerns.77
But my analysis goes further. In most cases, even if the declarant is
available, I do not believe that, as a matter of policy, best-evidence
considerations call for outright exclusion of the evidence. Given that the
73. It is also possible that exclusion of the hearsay will induce the proponent to present
live or deposition testimony, to the same proposition, given by another witness who is more
easily available than the hearsay declarant. For simplicity’s sake, I will put aside this relatively
unusual case.
74. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 282
(1988).
75. Cf. id. at 248 n.105 (noting that what today is often called the “best-evidence rule”
does not apply if the evidence is unavailable through no fault of the proponent).
76. Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 764–82 (1992).
77. It would not be if the hearsay were testimonial and offered against an accused. Putting
the burden on the accused to call a prosecution witness to the stand is not allowed. MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
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hearsay evidence the proponent wishes to introduce is more probative
than prejudicial, and that the opponent could produce the declarant as a
live witness, the hearsay ought to be admissible unless there is good
reason for excluding it. What good reason might there be?
One reason might be that the opponent would have a sound basis for
being reluctant to call the declarant as his own witness solely for the
chance of cross-examination.78 Most significantly, such a move is risky
because it will appear perplexing if the cross is not highly productive.
Sometimes this problem is a significant one, and sometimes not—it may
be that the opponent would have little interest in seeing the declarant
testify as a live and perhaps very persuasive witness.79 But in any event,
I believe that adopting a simple procedural feature will address this
problem and often lead to better results: If the opponent of the hearsay
timely produces the declarant, ready and able to testify, then the
proponent should usually be required to choose whether to present the
live testimony of the declarant as part of his case or forgo use of the
evidence.80
Another factor weighing in favor of excluding the hearsay may be
that the proponent is substantially better able than the opponent to
produce the declarant as a live witness. But even if so, I do not believe
that exclusion is usually warranted. The chance that the opponent would
have chosen to produce the declarant, even if his costs of doing so were
as low as the proponent’s, might be so small that admitting the hearsay
is still appropriate. For example, if the proponent has an advantage only
in some part of the tasks necessary to make the declarant a witness
(identifying the declarant, locating her, securing her presence, and
ensuring her willingness to testify), it might make sense to impose on
him only the burden of performing those tasks, and on the opponent the
burden of performing the others. It might also make sense to give the
opponent the option of demanding that the proponent produce the
declarant, but at the opponent’s expense.81
I acknowledge, nevertheless, that the situation in which the
proponent is substantially better able than the opponent to produce the
declarant is the one in which exclusion of hearsay is best justified,
notwithstanding that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial.
Perhaps in some rather extreme circumstances, if the opponent is a
criminal defendant, the difficulty is serious enough that the failure of
the prosecutor to produce the declarant should be considered a due
78. Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 883, 892–93 (1991).
79. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 748–49.
80. I have elaborated on the reasons for adopting this procedure in Friedman, supra note
78, at 892–98.
81. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 767–75.
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process violation.82 But bear in mind that by hypothesis, the out-ofcourt statement is not testimonial in nature. It was therefore—if a sound
conception of “testimonial” is used—not made in contemplation of
prosecution.83 The statement is probative evidence that the prosecution
is satisfied to use. What then would justify a ruling that the evidence is
constitutionally inadmissible on the ground that the prosecution could
have presented better evidence—specifically, live testimony by the
declarant? I believe the defendant ought to have to prove at least both
that (1) production of the declarant would be relatively easy and lowcost for the prosecution and difficult or impossible for the defense, and
(2) live testimony (including cross-examination) would likely be
substantially better for the truth-determination process than would
introduction of the out-of-court statement. Perhaps such a due process
doctrine is justifiable, and perhaps in some cases the accused could
make the showing. But this is not a matter of the accused being
deprived of the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
IV. THE CONFORMITY OF HEARSAY LAW TO THE CONFRONTATION
PRINCIPLE
Focusing primarily on evidence offered against an accused, I have
argued that there is usually good reason to exclude hearsay when it is
testimonial in nature and the opposing party has not had an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, and that there is usually not very
good reason to exclude the evidence otherwise. 84 This Part argues that,
to a considerable and perhaps surprising extent, prevailing doctrine, as
stated in the Federal Rules of Evidence, reflects this dichotomy. The
correlation is not perfect, to be sure, and over time as the confrontation
principle became obscured, it loosened up in some settings. But for the
most part, hearsay law replicates—in all settings, not just the one in
which a prosecutor offers evidence—the doctrine of the Confrontation
Clause as enunciated in Crawford. If (a) a statement is testimonial, (b)
the statement is offered for its truth, and (c) the declarant does not
testify at trial, then the statement will be excluded unless either (c) (1)
the declarant is unavailable and (2) the party–opponent has had an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination, or (d) the opponent has
forfeited the objection.85 In circumstances in which these principles do
not require exclusion, hearsay law tends to be receptive to the evidence.
I want to focus primarily on the degree to which hearsay law and the
82. See id. at 726 n.10.
83. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 597 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (holding that
certificates of lab reports were testimonial on the basis that authors were aware of their intended
evidentiary use).
84. See supra Parts II–III.
85. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
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Confrontation Clause draw a similar line between testimonial and
nontestimonial statements. But I will help clear the stage by first
demonstrating several other commonalities, each of which reflects a
limitation on both the Clause and on the rule against hearsay:
1. If a party makes or adopts a statement and it is then offered
against him, there is no problem under either the Confrontation Clause
or hearsay law. As has often been said, an accused has no right to
confront himself.86 Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) and (B)
exempt from the hearsay rule statements made or adopted by the party–
opponent.87
2. If the statement in question is not offered for the truth of a
proposition that it asserts, then neither confrontation doctrine nor the
rule against hearsay applies. Crawford makes this explicit.88 And so
does Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c)(2).89
3. If the declarant testifies at trial, that eliminates the confrontation
problem (under current doctrine) and may eliminate the hearsay
problem. Again, Crawford is explicit: “[W]hen the declarant appears for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”90 I think
that is an unfortunate statement,91 but it reflects the current state of
confrontation doctrine. As for the hearsay rule, significant exemptions
apply if the declarant testifies at trial—for certain inconsistent
statements,92 certain consistent statements,93 statements of
identification,94 and records made while a matter was fresh in the

86. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430, 443 (1840) (“[A] man’s own
acts, conduct, and declarations, when voluntary, are always admissible in evidence against
him.”); Peter Nicolas, But What If the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden
Declarants Found in Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1149, 1190 n.172
(2010) (explaining how the Confrontation Clause problem is eliminated for the prosecutor when
the accused adopts testimony as his own, because he clearly cannot confront himself).
87. A statement is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against an opposing party
and . . . was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity” or “is one the party
manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)–(B).
88. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (endorsing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
89. To fall within the definition of hearsay, a statement must be one that “a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
90. 541 U.S. at 60 n.9.
91. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner
of the Hearsay Thicket, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 289–92.
92. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
93. Id. 801(d)(1)(B).
94. Id. 801(d)(1)(C).
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witness’s memory.95
4. Neither the Confrontation Clause nor the rule against hearsay
will block admission of a testimonial statement made out of court if the
witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the party opponent has had
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Once again, Crawford
is explicit on this point, which reflects long-standing practice.96 And
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) establishes the same point with
respect to hearsay law.97
5. Both the confrontation right and an objection to the hearsay rule
may be forfeited by at least some wrongful conduct that renders the
declarant unavailable to testify at trial. Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6) establishes the forfeiture doctrine as part of hearsay law.
Crawford recognized the existence of the doctrine as part of the law
governing the Confrontation Clause.98 The Supreme Court addressed
the scope of the doctrine, for purposes of the Clause, in Giles v.
California.99 In my view, Giles gave the doctrine an unduly narrow
ambit, as does Rule 804(b)(6).100 Properly conceived, I believe that
forfeiture doctrine would explain the results achieved by the dying
declaration exception to the rule against hearsay.101 Given the
limitations on the doctrine established by Giles, the Court will probably
have to engraft onto the law of the Confrontation Clause an exception
for dying declarations akin to the one in Rule 804(b)(2).102 That, I
believe, is very unfortunate, but it need not detain us here. For now, the
point is that once again the law of hearsay resembles the law of
confrontation as established in Crawford.
Now let us focus on the divide between testimonial and
nontestimonial statements.
6. If a statement is offered against an accused and none of the
95. Id. 803(5).
96. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”); see also id. at 53–54, 59.
97. This rule now appears, of course, as an exception to the hearsay rule. In older days,
the rule was conceived as an alternative way in which testimony might be presented. See, e.g.,
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 336–37 (3d ed. 2004).
98. 541 U.S. at 62.
99. 554 U.S. 353, 365–66 (2008).
100. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal Reflection, 13 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 733, 743–44 (2009).
101. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
102. The Court allowed for this possibility in Crawford. See 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
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constraints on the reach of the Confrontation Clause stated above
apply, then admission of the statement violates the Clause if the
statement is testimonial, but not otherwise. If none of the constraints
stated above on the reach of the rule against hearsay applies, admission
of the statement will probably violate the rule if the statement is
testimonial and will probably not violate the rule if the statement is not
testimonial. Four propositions are embedded in this assertion—under
each of two doctrines, the Confrontation Clause and hearsay law, a
restrictive proposition concerning testimonial statements and a
permissive proposition concerning nontestimonial statements. The two
propositions involving confrontation doctrine are now elementary.
Suppose that (1) a statement by a person other than the accused is
offered against the accused to prove the truth of what it asserts, (2) the
person who made the statement does not testify at trial, (3) either that
person could reasonably have been made a witness at trial or the
accused has not had an opportunity for cross-examination, and (4) the
accused has not forfeited the confrontation right. (For these purposes, I
will treat the possibility that the statement falls within a dying
declaration exception as a species of forfeiture.) If the statement is
testimonial, its admission against the accused violates the confrontation
right—that is the essence of Crawford.103 And if the statement is
nontestimonial, its admission does not violate the right. That, as I have
noted above, has been made clear in subsequent cases.104
Now consider the hearsay side of the near equation, and first the
restrictive aspect. Assume (1) the statement is offered for its truth
against a party and it was not made or adopted by that party, (2) the
declarant does not testify at trial, (3) either the declarant could
reasonably have been made a witness at trial or the party opponent has
not had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, and (4) the party
opponent has not forfeited the hearsay objection. (Again I treat the
dying declaration exception as an aspect of forfeiture doctrine.) Assume
further that the statement is testimonial in nature—which for our
purposes means that it was made in circumstances that would lead a
reasonable person in the position of the declarant to believe that the
statement would likely be used as proof in an identifiable litigation.105
103. Id. at 68–69.
104. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
823–26 (2006); see also supra Part III.
105. By the reference to identifiable litigation, I mean to indicate that the declarant was
aware, at the time of the statement, of a dispute involving a given incident or perhaps given
parties or a given relationship that either was, or plausibly would be, in litigation. For example,
if a person makes a statement to the police about what happened in an auto accident, that would
be testimonial, even if she did not identify the people involved. If she made a statement bearing
on a litigable dispute with another person, that would be testimonial if offered in litigation
concerning a later, similar dispute between the same persons. But a statement that, say, records a
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Given these assumptions, the statement would probably be inadmissible
under the rule against hearsay.
To see this, note first that because the statement is offered for the
truth of what it asserts, it falls within the basic definition of hearsay in
Federal Rules of Evidence 801(a) through (c), and so is presumptively
excluded by Rule 802. And by assumption the exemptions most likely
to apply to testimonial statements—those for prior statements made by a
witness who testifies at trial, for former testimony by a declarant who is
unavailable to testify at trial, and for cases of forfeiture and dying
declarations—do not apply. Look over the list of the other exemptions.
You will notice that virtually all of them—for family records,106
statements in ancient documents,107 market reports,108 statements in
learned treatises,109 and so forth—apply completely or nearly so to
statements that are not made in contemplation of identifiable litigation.
To be sure, the line is not perfect. Over the last couple of centuries,
courts and rulemakers have stretched some of the exemptions to reach
some testimonial statements. I will consider three primary examples.
First is the family of exceptions for spontaneous declarations,110
which emerged in the nineteenth century.111 Earlier courts had been
careful to admit such statements only if they could be considered part of
the res gestae, or the story being told, and even in the late nineteenth
century, courts were sometimes rigorous about not letting this doctrine
be used to admit statements that really were reports on events.112 Even
as the doctrine developed into a recognizable exception to the hearsay
rule, it was supposed to be limited to statements made so spontaneously
as to preclude the possibility of conscious reflection.113 But by the end
of the twentieth century, many courts were using these exemptions to
allow in statements that had been made a considerable time after the
event in question and quite clearly in contemplation of litigation114—a

routine transaction would not ordinarily be testimonial. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (noting that business and public records usually are
not testimonial within the meaning of Confrontation Clause doctrine because they are “created
for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact at trial,” but holding that the lab analyst’s statements involved in that case, even if
they might be characterized as business or official records, were “prepared specifically” for use
at accused’s trial, and so were “testimony against” him).
106. FED. R. EVID. 803(13).
107. Id. 803(16).
108. Id. 803(17).
109. Id. 803(18).
110. Id. 803(1)–(3).
111. See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 18, at 516–18.
112. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1213–16.
113. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s note.
114. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1200–01.
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practice that Hammon v. Indiana curbed to some extent.115
Second is the group of exceptions116 that includes most notably
those for records of regularly conducted activities117 and for public
records.118 Almost by definition, most of these are nontestimonial—they
are made as a matter of ordinary routine and not in contemplation of
litigation.119 That was very clearly so with respect to the traditional
“shopbook rule” from which the exception for records of routinely kept
records emerged.120 But in the modern day, there are some categories of
statements, most notably forensic laboratory reports, that are made
routinely and in contemplation of litigation. Some courts recognized
that these exceptions were not meant to justify admission of reports
made for prosecutorial use;121 others did not.122 Once again it required a
Confrontation Clause decision by the Supreme Court—in this case,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts—to ensure that the hearsay exceptions
were not used to justify the admission of out-of-court testimonial
statements.123
Finally, consider the hearsay exception for declarations against
interest.124 Traditionally, the rule did not apply to statements tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability.125 On the assumption that the
exception should be shaped in an attempt to guarantee the admissibility
of reliable evidence, such a limitation makes very little sense.126 The
limitation is much more sensible, however, if one recognizes that a high
proportion of statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal
liability are testimonial. The drafters of the Federal Rules, focusing on
reliability, did away with the limitation. They did, however, indicate
115. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 820–21, 829–32, 834 (2006) (companion case)
(determining that Amy Hammon’s oral statement, accusing her husband of assault and made to
a police officer while she was protected and he was held at bay, was testimonial).
116. FED. R . EVID. 803(6)–(10).
117. Id. 803(6).
118. Id. 803(8).
119. That is not necessarily true about some public records, but notice that such records
that are made in contemplation of prosecution and offered against an accused almost certainly
fall afoul of the qualifications in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8)(A)(ii) and (iii).
120. Developments in Maryland Law, 1991–92, 52 MD. L. REV. 530, 709 n.179 (1993)
(“The authorities are consistent in finding that the present day business records exception is an
outgrowth of the common-law ‘shopbook rule.’”).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t was the clear
intention of Congress to make evaluative and law enforcement reports absolutely inadmissible
against defendants in criminal cases.”).
122. See, e.g., State v. Merritt, 591 S.W.2d 107, 112–14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); United
States v. Evans, 45 C.M.R. 353, 355–56 (1972).
123. 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2010); see also supra note 105.
124. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
125. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913).
126. This was a point made effectively by Justice Holmes, joined by Justices Lurton and
Hughes, dissenting in the Donnelly case. Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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one significant qualification: “[A] statement admitting guilt and
implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be
motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail
to qualify as against interest.”127 In some cases that may be true, but in
some cases it is almost certainly false—depending on how serious an
admission of culpability the declarant has made. But such a statement is
almost certainly testimonial. Nevertheless, courts in the decades after
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not uniformly exclude
statements made to the authorities by absent declarants who inculpated
themselves as well as another. One decision tolerating admissibility of
such a statement was reversed on Confrontation Clause grounds in
Crawford v. Washington.128
In each of these three settings, then, an older conception of hearsay
law would not have allowed admissibility of testimonial hearsay. By the
beginning of this century, in the absence of a coherent theory of the
confrontation right, the resistance to allowing testimonial statements
had softened sufficiently that in these contexts courts often let them slip
by.129 Crawford and its progeny effectively plugged these holes with
respect to prosecution evidence.
I am not, therefore, contending that hearsay law does a perfect job
of policing against the admission of testimonial statements—far from it.
I am saying that for the most part, the enumerated exemptions to the
hearsay rule apply to nontestimonial statements, and that this was
especially so in older days, before courts and rulemakers, losing track of
the need to prevent a system by which witnesses could effectively
testify without coming to trial, loosened up considerably on hearsay that
appeared likely to be accurate.130
127. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note.
128. 541 U.S. 36, 38–39, 68–69 (2004).
129. There were other examples as well, including the willingness of some courts in the
decades before Crawford to allow admission of flagrantly testimonial statements made in formal
settings, such as grand jury proceedings, often using the residual exception (now set forth in
Federal Rule of Evidence 807) as a way around the hearsay rule. See, e.g., United States v.
Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118–20 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
130. By referring to “enumerated exceptions,” I mean to set apart the residual exception,
Federal Rule of Evidence 807. As I have just noted, that exception was sometimes applied
before Crawford to testimonial statements. Supra note 129. But the history of the exception
proves the broader point. Creation of the exception (then in two separate provisions, Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5)) was controversial; the House of Representatives deleted it from the draft
of the Rules submitted by the Supreme Court. In restoring a narrower form of the exception, the
Senate Judiciary Committee wrote:
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not
intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in
rules 803 and 804(b).
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Now let us consider the permissive aspect of the assertion I have
made about hearsay—that is, that if a statement is not testimonial,
hearsay law will very likely tolerate its admissibility. I cannot
demonstrate this proposition to a certainty or anywhere near, at least not
in the space available here. But the proposition is not one that scholars
would find surprising.131 And its truth is suggested by the profusion of
exemptions that apply to nontestimonial hearsay, some purportedly
supported by very dubious grounds of reliability,132 and the invitation
extended by the residual exception133 to admit, on case-specific
grounds, hearsay not falling within the recognized exemptions.
Let us consider in this light the exemption for conspirator
statements,134 which lies near the heart of Professor Trachtenberg’s
argument. I agree with much of what he says in this context: The
traditional rationales offered for the exemption are very weak.135 The
proposition that one conspirator is an agent of the other(s) presumably
justified inclusion of this exemption in Rule 801(d)(2), along with other
variants of what have traditionally been called party admissions—but
even the Advisory Committee that drafted the rule asserted that “the
agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction.”136 The argument that
statements by a conspirator have significance in themselves, not merely
as reports but as part of the conspiracy in operation, sometimes has

S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066. Active use of the
residual exception to admit testimonial evidence was therefore a development of the late
twentieth century.
131. See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 & n.3;
Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV.
797, 799–800 (1992) (“[I]t is only a marginal overstatement to say that today, at least in civil
cases, the hearsay rule applies in any robust fashion only to available nonparty witnesses within
the subpoena power of the court. And it does not apply to them very rigorously. . . . The hearsay
rule is, in short, no longer a rule of exclusion; it is instead a rule of admission that is doing its
subversive work under the cover of darkness.” (footnote omitted)).
132. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a
Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 651 (1992) (“[T]he
‘reliability’ rationale of the exception for spontaneous declarations has been more the result of
tradition than of fact, and has been soundly criticized by commentators—a fact ignored by the
Supreme Court.”); id. at 651 n.110 (“If judged from the standpoint of the reliability of the
representations on the basis of perception, the law relating to the admission of spontaneous
exclamations is amazing. If the observer speaks before he thinks, the evidence is admissible; if
he thinks before he speaks, it is excluded.” (quoting Mason Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5
OKLA. L. REV. 271, 286 (1952))).
133. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
134. See id. 801(d)(2)(E). As noted above, supra note 6, I am referring to “conspirators”
rather than to “co-conspirators” in deference to Professor Duane, the leading scholar (albeit by
default) on that choice.
135. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1686–88.
136. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note.
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force; a prosecutor does, indeed, often have to show how conspiracies
operate, and often they operate in large part through the statements of
their members. But often the principal reason for which the proponent
offers the statement is to prove the truth of what the conspirator said.137
And the idea that conspirators’ statements tend to be especially reliable
is, as Professor Trachtenberg suggests, nonsense.138 As a class, I do not
believe that they are any more reliable than was the statement, discussed
below, of the Portuguese gentleman in Raleigh.
But where does that leave us? Professor Trachtenberg argues that
conspirators’ statements are admissible on grounds of necessity—
convicting conspirators is an important social aim, and because
conspirators make conviction difficult by acting secretively, it is
necessary to bend principle and admit evidence that would otherwise be
unacceptable.139 Frankly, I find the suggestion startling. If the exclusion
of a given form of evidence really does reflect a fundamental principle,
it would be disturbing to allow it in nonetheless to facilitate conviction
of a given type of crime. Such a doctrine, I think, would be very hard to
confine, with respect to either the crimes it might address (especially
because conspiracy is far from the most serious, or the most difficult to
prove, of all crimes), or the rights of an accused that we would be
willing to abridge. Indeed, it would seem to apply equally to evidence
of other out-of-court statements tending to prove that the accused was a
member of the conspiracy, whether the declarant was a member of the
conspiracy or not.140
I have an alternative explanation for the exemption. In accordance
with the arguments I have made in this Essay, assume that if live
testimony by a person to a proposition would be admissible, then
evidence that the person made a nontestimonial assertion of that
proposition should probably be admitted as well. Then the exemption
137. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1689 (citing United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549
(7th Cir. 1979)).
138. Id. at 1687–88.
139. Id. at 1689.
140. Thus, it appears to me that this rationale would apply equally in two cases in which
Professor Trachtenberg argues vigorously that the evidence should be excluded. Id. at 1696–99,
1709–13. In United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 554–55 (5th Cir. 2011), discussed below
in Section V.B, the defendants were accused of participating in a conspiracy, which was proved
in part by statements made before the confederates’ activities were illegal. And in the Raleigh
case, discussed in Section V.A, the statements at issue asserted that Raleigh was part of a
conspiracy to kill the king. In Raleigh, neither statement would satisfy the exemption because
one was made by a nonconspirator (the Portuguese gentleman) and the other, Cobham’s
confession to the authorities (which was clearly testimonial), clearly did not support the
conspiracy. But any of these statements, it appears, would satisfy the necessity rationale
advanced by Professor Trachtenberg; the calculus under that rationale does not appear to be
affected by the fact that, at the time of the statement, the person making it was not a member of
the charged conspiracy speaking in furtherance of it.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8

458

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

for conspirator statements marks out a segment of the border between
nontestimonial statements, which presumably should be admitted, and
testimonial ones, which presumably should be excluded. On the one
hand, if a statement is genuinely made during the course of and in
furtherance of a conspiracy, then virtually by definition it is not
testimonial—in making the statement, the declarant was trying to
advance the aims of the conspiracy, and presumably she would not have
made the statement if she believed there was a substantial probability
that it would instead become evidence used to destroy the conspiracy
and punish its members. Thus, the confrontation principle does not pose
an obstacle to admission, and the exemption ensures that neither does
the rule against hearsay. On the other hand, if a conspirator tells a
known police officer about the activities of the conspiracy, that
statement presumably is inimical to the interests of the conspiracy and
so should not fall within the exemption.141 It is also almost certainly
testimonial in nature. Thus, the two doctrines yield the same result in
this context as well: the confrontation right demands exclusion and the
exemption does not remove the hearsay bar.
Again, I am not suggesting that hearsay doctrine perfectly reflects
the confrontation principle; given that the principle was obscured for so
long, that could hardly be true. I do believe that much of hearsay
doctrine represents a groping in the dark for an underlying value. That
value is not that unreliable evidence ought to be excluded. It is, rather,
that a witness should testify in the presence of an adverse party, subject
to cross-examination.
V. TWO APPLICATIONS
I argue in this Essay for a rather strong dichotomy. On the one hand,
the law should insist on preserving the right of a criminal defendant to
demand that witnesses against him testify face-to-face and are subject to
cross-examination. On the other hand, the law should take a far more
receptive attitude than it does now towards nontestimonial hearsay.
Arguing against such receptivity, Professor Trachtenberg invokes the
case of Sir Walter Raleigh.142 And at the heart of his Essay lies his
objection to the willingness of some courts to admit statements on a
“lawful joint venture” theory. This Part addresses both these matters.
A. The Raleigh Case
141. I realize that some nontestimonial statements made by a conspirator might be relevant
to the case and yet fall outside the formal bounds of the exemption—for example, “idle chatter”
and statements made after the conspiracy has achieved its principal aim or been abandoned. But
courts are resourceful in finding that these statements served the purpose of the conspiracy—by
recruiting members and customers, for example—and that the conspiracy was still in force at the
time of the statement.
142. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1709–11.
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One of the statements used to convict Raleigh would probably now
be considered nontestimonial. Professor Trachtenberg seems to assume
that any theory that allows presentation of hearsay of the type used
against Raleigh must be seriously deficient. I will take the issue headon: I acknowledge that under my approach, the confrontation right
would probably not exclude evidence of the statement—but I do not
regard this as troublesome.
As Professor Trachtenberg points out, the Raleigh case involved two
significant statements that would now be considered hearsay. One of
these—and the one that I believe is primarily responsible for the infamy
of the case—was the confession of Raleigh’s principal accuser, Lord
Cobham, who, as Raleigh said, was “alive, and in the house.”143 In the
parlance of Crawford, the statement was clearly testimonial, and
Raleigh made vigorous, persistent, and repeated complaints against his
prosecutors’ failure to bring Cobham “face-to-face” against him at
trial.144 He emphasized that this failure violated the basic precepts of a
fair English trial. “If there be but a trial of five marks at Common Law,”
he argued, “a witness must be deposed. Good my lords, let my Accuser
come face to face, and be deposed.”145 And it was clear that his
objection, though ultimately of no avail to him, registered with his
listeners.146 Apart from emphasizing the validity of confessions, neither
the Commissioners trying the case nor Attorney General Coke
challenged Raleigh’s contention that the norm in an ordinary, nontreason case would have been to bring the accusing witnesses face-toface. Cobham’s statement, in short, was a testimonial accusation, and by
a witness who was readily available—and the dispute over it indicates
that, even at the time, allowing it to be used without producing Cobham
appeared to be a violation of fundamental principles.
In contrast, consider the second hearsay statement, the one Professor
Trachtenberg emphasizes.147 One Dyer, a pilot, testified that in Lisbon
he had the following encounter with a gentleman:
[E]nquiring what countryman I was, I said, an Englishman.
Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned? And I
143. 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 19 (1809); see also id. at 23.
144. Id. at 15, 18, 19, 23.
145. Id. at 19.
146. Lord Chief Justice Popham contended that “[w]here no circumstances do concur to
make a matter probable, then an accuser may be heard; but so many circumstances agreeing and
confirming the accusation in this case, the accuser is not to be produced.” 1 DAVID JARDINE,
CRIMINAL TRIALS 427 (1835). In the end he and the prosecutors were driven to fall back on
arguments of state security, which essentially presuppose the guilt of the prisoner. For example,
Judge Popham referred to communications between Raleigh and Cobham before the trial, with
the innuendo that Raleigh may have bribed Cobham to change his testimony. 2 COBBETT’S,
supra note 143, at 20.
147. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1709–10.
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answered, No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly.
Nay, saith he, he shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh
and Don Cobham will cut his throat ere that day come.148
Raleigh challenged the usefulness of the evidence, to be sure, but for
its lack of probative value rather than for any fundamental violation of
procedure. “This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly Priest,”
he said, “but what proof is it against me?”149 The chief prosecutor,
Attorney General Coke, responded: “It must per force arise out of some
preceding intelligence, and shows that your treason had wings.”150 In
other words, Coke contended that the evidence had circumstantial value
because the Portuguese gentleman could not be thought to have come
up with the story of Raleigh’s involvement unless there were some
basis—“some preceding intelligence”—for the statement. And in reply,
Raleigh offered an alternative explanation, making a short speech to the
effect that it was not surprising that Cobham’s treason in aid of Spain
had become known in Lisbon, and that his own name was presumably
thrown in to add weight to the conspiracy.151 But he did not press the
matter. He did not argue, for example, that efforts should be made to
produce, or even identify, the Portuguese gentleman. Nor did he argue
that because of the failure of the prosecution to make such efforts, or
simply because of the absence of the Portuguese gentleman—which
meant that his statement was unsworn, that the triers had no opportunity
to evaluate his demeanor, and that Raleigh had no opportunity for crossexamination—the statement should not be presented.
In short, Raleigh’s reaction to the statement of the Portuguese
gentleman was not based on the assertion that his right to be brought
face-to-face with an adverse witness had been violated. And a
comparison of his treatment of that statement with that of Cobham’s
suggests that it is the latter, and not the former, that is responsible for
the infamy that the prosecution of Raleigh has suffered for centuries.
But suppose that a case like this arose today. What should happen,
given the limitation of the confrontation right to testimonial statements?
Let’s put aside the possibility that the statement should be considered
testimonial, though the matter is not completely free from doubt.152 And
148. 2 COBBETT’S, supra note 143, at 25.
149. 1 JARDINE, supra note 146, at 436.
150. Id.
151. 2 COBBETT’S, supra note 143, at 25.
152. If the statement was made with the anticipation that it would in fact be passed on and
used in a prosecution, then it should be considered testimonial. It could be that the statement
was a surreptitious attempt to plant evidence that would be used to help prosecute Raleigh. So
far as I know, however, there is no evidence that this was true of the Portuguese gentleman’s
statement. Also, one could argue that when a person makes a statement accusing another of a
crime, and does so beyond a closed circle of people whom he can trust not to pass the
information on to the authorities, the statement is necessarily testimonial, because there is a
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I will put aside also the possibility that the statement ought to be
admitted on grounds similar to those enunciated by Coke—not to prove
the truth of what it asserts but as circumstantial evidence that the
conspiracy was afoot. Let’s assume instead that the prosecutor takes the
bull by the horns and offers the statement to prove that Raleigh was in
fact part of a conspiracy to murder the king. By hypothesis, the
Confrontation Clause does not require exclusion. For several reasons, I
am not troubled by this.
First is a matter of principle: The Portuguese gentleman, by
hypothesis, simply was not acting as a witness against Raleigh.
Allowing evidence of what he said, whatever problems it might pose,
does not contribute to a system by which witnesses can testify against
criminal defendants without coming face-to-face and being subjected to
cross-examination.
Second, there is no particular reason to suppose that a jury would
fail to recognize the factors that diminish the probative value of the
evidence. And there is no basis for concluding that the jury’s
overvaluation of the evidence would be so great that its prejudicial
impact would be greater than its probative value. If this is correct, then
the evidence advances the truth-determination process. And of course if
a court regards it as incorrect, the court would presumably exclude the
evidence on that basis.153
Third, other nonconstitutional doctrines also might call for the
evidence to be excluded. In particular, it appears that there was no
showing that the Portuguese gentleman spoke from personal
knowledge.154 (Most American courts would probably regard it as
inadmissible hearsay, though under the analysis presented here—given
that the statement is nontestimonial and that the prosecutor was
presumably in no better a position than the accused to produce the
declarant—an optimal system would not reach this result.)
Fourth, I believe that, to the extent admissibility of the Portuguese
gentleman’s statement appears frightening, it is because of the thought
that a conviction could be based on it alone. But in fact, if there is no
other substantial evidence of Raleigh’s guilt, the court should conclude
that there is insufficient evidence to support a verdict, and grant the
defense a motion to dismiss the charge as a matter of law. A jury could
not reasonably conclude that Raleigh’s guilt was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by Dyer’s testimony that an unidentified declarant
substantial probability that it will indeed be passed on. I might find such a rule rather attractive,
but I do not believe the Supreme Court is likely to adopt it in the foreseeable future.
153. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
154. See id. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”); id. 803
advisory committee’s note (stating that a hearsay “declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither
this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge” in Rule 602).
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made a statement asserting, without elaboration, that Raleigh was
conspiring to kill the king. In a sufficiently egregious case, failure to
grant judgment as a matter of law could be considered constitutional
error. If, on the other hand, we assume that there is sufficient evidence
to support a verdict of guilt, and the Portuguese gentleman was
recounting in idle conversation an event that he had personally
observed—say, that Raleigh and Cobham had entered a tavern
together—it does not seem so horrifying to allow that to be added to the
mix of evidence that the jury may consider.
Finally, suppose we alter the facts slightly in another way, and there
is enough evidence to support a finding that the Portuguese gentleman
was a member of the conspiracy at the time he made the statement, and
that making it advanced the purposes of the conspiracy, perhaps by
helping to recruit members. Then the statement would fit within the
hearsay exemption for conspirators’ statements and would satisfy the
Confrontation Clause under pre-Crawford law. But, as Professor
Trachtenberg’s article indicates, the statement is not substantially more
reliable given the assumption that it fits within the exemption than it is
absent the assumption.155
In short, perhaps the Portuguese gentleman’s statement should not
be admitted, and it certainly ought not support a verdict on its own. But
it does not appear to pose a problem under the Confrontation Clause.
B. Lawful Joint Ventures
Under the “lawful joint venture” theory, as ably described by
Professor Trachtenberg, some courts have been willing to admit against
a party a statement made in support of a joint undertaking of which that
party was a member, without proof that the venture was illegal.156
Professor Trachtenberg argues that such statements have no particular
guarantees of reliability.157 I agree. But this is not to say that such
hearsay is not useful evidence. In fact, it may well be extremely useful.
Consider United States v. El-Mezain,158 the case on which Professor
Trachtenberg particularly focuses.159 In that case, a prosecution for
funneling money to Hamas, which the United States and many other
nations regard as a terrorist organization, the prosecution introduced a
trove of documents discovered in the homes of two unindicted
conspirators.160 As described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
155. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1685–89.
156. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1669.
157. Id.
158. 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011).
159. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1697–700. He also discusses United States v. Gewin,
471 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2006), which I address infra note 165.
160. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 484, 494.
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Circuit, these documents “included annual reports, meeting agendas and
minutes, financial records, work papers, and telephone directories that
documented the activities of the Palestine Committee [a supervisory
organization for many of the acts charged] and demonstrated the
defendants’ participation with the Committee.”161 The documents were
extensive and detailed, and provided clear support for the proposition
that the defendants were working at that time to raise money for Hamas.
At the time, Hamas had not yet been classified as a terrorist
organization, so the activities reported were not illegal, but clearly they
were relevant to the defendants’ later activities.162
With a proper foundation, these documents, or at least most of them,
presumably could have been admitted as routinely kept records. But the
prosecution did not lay that foundation.163 Nor could it bring the
documents within the bounds of the conspirator exemption as
traditionally understood, because, at that point, the venture described
was legal.164 But under Fifth Circuit law,165 a statement can qualify
under the conspirator exemption, established for the federal courts in
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), even though it was “made in furtherance of a lawful
joint undertaking.”166
I will not quarrel with Professor Trachtenberg’s view that this
doctrine extends the Rule beyond its intended meaning.167 That, of
course, illustrates the tendency of courts, as I have noted above, to find
a way to loosen the bounds of hearsay law. And in this case, the result
itself—putting aside legal-process concerns created by distortion of the
current Rule—strikes me as perfectly sound. The documents were
clearly nontestimonial. They were certainly not written in anticipation
that they would be used as evidence in a prosecution, or indeed in any
other kind of case. Rather, at least on their face, they appear to be
recordings of an ongoing operation intended to assist and promote its
activities. They appear to have been written by one or more persons in a
position to know the truth and without any incentive to mislead a reader
161. Id. at 501.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 498–501.
164. Id. at 501–03.
165. The Fifth Circuit is not alone in taking this view. Professor Trachtenberg also
discusses United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006), in which the District of
Columbia Circuit noted that this was the long-established law of the Circuit. But in that case, the
key statement, in Professor Trachtenberg’s rendition, was in effect, “I’ll tell the CEO,” offered
to prove that the speaker did in fact tell the CEO. Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1690. Under the
traditional Hillmon doctrine, which was clearly intended to be incorporated by Federal Rule
Evidence 803(3), that evidence is admissible as a statement of a then-existing state of mind. See
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892).
166. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 502.
167. See Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 1689–92. I also do not mean to engage in a debate
over the merits of the prosecution.
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in any way material to their later use in litigation. They were highly
probative; even if one believes that the documents were not particularly
reliable, that does not mean they lacked substantial probative value. On
the contrary, I believe that most reasonable jurors would regard the
documents as having altered substantially the probability in favor of the
truth of the propositions asserted in the documents.
In short, though it may stretch standard doctrine to exempt
statements of this sort from the rule against hearsay, this is a result
that—whether by stretching the rule as it stands or by changing it—
ought to be reached. Perhaps in succeeding generations, admission of
documents like this will not appear to be such a stretch. In the next Part,
I will offer a few thoughts on how the law might look in those
generations.
VI. A GLANCE AHEAD
I believe that the transformation of confrontation doctrine wrought
by Crawford has given us a great opportunity to reframe hearsay law,
for two reasons. First, Crawford has helped us focus on the fact that the
principal reason why some hearsay ought to be excluded is that to admit
it would essentially allow a witness to testify without confronting the
adverse party or being subjected to cross-examination. When the
adverse party is a criminal defendant, that problem of course renders the
evidence constitutionally invalid. But even when another litigant is the
adverse party, the fact that the hearsay is testimonial in nature is at least
an important consideration; we expect witnesses to provide evidence for
trial by testifying at trial, not by, say, signing an affidavit.
Second, hearsay law has been called on to implement the
confrontation principle. As the analysis in Part IV suggests, it has done
so in a clumsy and very imperfect way—by a broad presumptive
exclusion of all hearsay and then by carving out from that definition a
long set of exemptions that, for the most part, do not cover testimonial
hearsay. Now that the confrontation right has been separately articulated
and protected for criminal defendants—which also makes it more likely
as well that the confrontation principle will be protected in other
settings—hearsay law can be relaxed in other settings where the hearsay
is nontestimonial.
This Part sketches an outline of how hearsay law may be shaped in
years to come. I do not attempt to be comprehensive here. For
simplicity, I assume that at the time the hearsay issue is raised, the
declarant has neither appeared at trial nor been subjected to crossexamination in a deposition or other proceeding,168 and that neither
168. Whether the opportunity to take a witness’s deposition for discovery purposes
amounts to an opportunity for cross-examination for purposes of the Confrontation Clause is a
sharply contested issue. Compare, e.g., State v. Lopez, 974 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2008) (holding in
the negative), with Berkman v. State, 976 N.E.2d 68 (Ind. App. 2012), transfer denied, 984
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party has engaged in wrongful conduct that might render her
unavailable. And I also assume that the court adopts a procedural
feature suggested above—that if the opponent of the hearsay timely
produces the declarant, ready and able to testify, then the proponent
should usually be put to the choice of presenting the live testimony of
the declarant as part of his case or forgo use of the evidence.169
In general, I believe the admissibility of hearsay, given the
assumptions stated above, should depend on the answers to four
questions: Is the hearsay testimonial? Is the hearsay more probative than
prejudicial? Is the proponent substantially better able than the opponent
to produce the declarant? Has the proponent given substantial notice of
intent to offer the hearsay? I now suggest briefly the bearing each of
these should have on the result.170
Is the statement testimonial? Under the assumptions stated, if the
out-of-court statement is testimonial and it is offered against an accused,
then admitting it violates the Confrontation Clause. If it is offered
against another party, the Clause does not apply, but the broader
confrontation principle—that witnesses testify in the presence of the
adverse party and are subject to cross-examination—still does, though
probably it should not apply with equal force.171
N.E.2d 221 (Ind. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 155 (2013). I filed the unsuccessful petition for
certiorari in Berkman, No. 12-10691; it explains reasons why I believe the answer should be
negative, and the opportunity to take a deposition for discovery purposes should not be
considered the equivalent, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, of the opportunity for
cross-examination at a deposition taken by the prosecution to preserve the testimony of a
witness who will not assuredly appear at trial. Perhaps the considerations are different when the
confrontation right is not at stake, particularly in a civil case; perhaps then the opportunity to
take a deposition for discovery purposes should be deemed to be an opportunity for crossexamination for purposes of the rule against hearsay. That strikes me as a complex issue on
which my thinking is unsettled and I do not now wish to state any opinion whatever. For
purposes of the discussion in this Article, then, the assumption that the opponent has not had an
opportunity for cross-examination in a deposition means that either (a) the opponent had no
opportunity for a deposition at all, which is true most of the time in most criminal justice
systems in the United States and could happen even in civil litigation, as with a late-appearing
witness, or (b) the opponent had an opportunity to question the witness at a deposition, but the
opportunity is not deemed to be one for cross-examination. Similarly, I am assuming that either
the opponent had no opportunity to question the witness at another proceeding (such as a
probable cause hearing) or that such an opportunity should not be deemed to be one for crossexamination.
169. I have elaborated on the reasons for adopting this procedure. See Friedman, supra note
78, at 892–98.
170. I will not attempt here to set out a detailed algorithm for how a court should arrive at
results. I still adhere, though, to most of the views set forth in a previous article, GameTheoretic. See Friedman, supra note 76.
171. For example, when the party opponent is not an accused, perhaps a somewhat
narrower conception of what is “testimonial” should apply. And perhaps the exclusionary rule
should not be quite as categorical as when the opponent is the accused. Thus, courts should
probably be willing in certain cases to allow witnesses to testify from remote locations by
electronic means, even though the party opponent is not present in the same room. Cf. Order of
the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.) (stating, with reference to
the Confrontation Clause: “Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.”). Perhaps also limited
and well-defined categories of testimonial statements—such as certifications of the authenticity
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Is the evidence more prejudicial than probative? If the answer to
this question is affirmative, then ordinarily the hearsay should simply be
inadmissible.172 If, however, the answer is negative and the statement is
nontestimonial, that should create a presumption in favor of
admissibility. And, as I have indicated above, if live testimony of the
declarant to a given proposition would be more probative than
prejudicial, then usually the hearsay statement will be as well.
Is the proponent substantially better able than the opponent to
produce the declarant? If the answer is negative, then that will weigh
heavily in favor of admission. If the answer is affirmative, the court
might consider whether it should give the opponent the option of
demanding that the proponent produce the declarant, at the opponent’s
expense, as a condition of introducing the evidence. Or, if the
proponent’s advantage is only an informational one—for example, he
knows the identity and location of the declarant—the court might
consider making admissibility of the statement contingent on the
proponent’s passing that information along to the opponent.
Has the proponent given substantial notice of intent to offer the
hearsay? The importance of notice, I believe, is not to prevent surprise
but rather to give the opponent an opportunity, if he so chooses, to
produce the declarant as a live witness. I am not suggesting that there be
an absolute notice rule; in some cases, it may be apparent that, even
given ample notice, the opponent would have no interest in producing
the declarant. But in some cases, delay of notice ought to shift the
burden, or at least the cost, of producing the declarant to the proponent.
My main reason for offering this brief sketch of how hearsay law
may be shaped in the future is to make a more general point: Unlike
Professor Trachtenberg, I believe the confrontation principle—the basic
concept that a witness should testify face-to-face with the adverse party
and be subject to cross-examination—has a central place in our
adjudicative system. This principle not only explains the Confrontation
Clause but lies at the heart of what is worth preserving in the rule
against hearsay. Once the principle is separately articulated and
protected, the complex oddities of hearsay law become disposable. We
need not worry about doctrinal boundaries of the type that Professor
Trachtenberg defends, between conspiracies and lawful joint ventures.
We can instead deal with nontestimonial hearsay in a flexible,
pragmatic manner, in the way that most evidentiary decisions are made.
We can join almost all the rest of the world in doing so without a
dogmatic structure of hearsay law, and yet remain faithful to our
fundamental principles governing how witnesses testify.

of documents—ought to be admissible, on grounds of efficiency, even without any opportunity
for cross-examination.
172. One can imagine a situation, though, in which the opponent is better able than the
proponent to produce the declarant, and admission of the hearsay would induce the opponent to
produce the declarant as a live witness. See Friedman, supra note 78, at 899.
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